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It has now become incumbent upon philosophers everywhere to reflect 
in the wider framework of a roughly unified international “planetary cul­
ture” which was seen to be emerging as early as Hegel and Marx, both of 
whom thought of it as a community of self-corrective discovery and 
understanding. By the time of William Ernest Hocking and Arnold 
Toynbee there was little doubt that the world, as Hocking put it, “is 
becoming a single unit for mankind, but men and women are slow in 
accepting their global interdependence.” Men and women in the physical 
and social sciences have long been aware that their work is being done in 
a community unlimited in scope. Reviewing accounts recently published 
of the damage caused by the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
Lewis Thomas speaks as follows out of his work in the Sloan-Kettering 
Cancer Center in New York:
We live today in a world densely populated by human beings living 
in close communication with each other all over the surface of the 
planet. Viewed from a certain distance the earth has the look of a 
single society, a community, the swarming of an intensely social 
species trying to figure out ways to become successfully inter­
dependent. We obviously need, at this stage, to begin the construction 
of some sort of world civilization.1
1 From his review of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social 
Effects of the Atomic Bombings, by the Committee for the Compilation of Materials 
on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, trans. Eisci 
Ishikawa and David L. Swain (New York: Basic Books, 1981); and of Unforgettable 
Fire: Pictures Drawn by Atomic Bomb Survivors, ed. Japan Broadcasting Corp. (New 
York: Pantheon, 1981), in New York Review (September 24, 1981), p. 3.
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While most philosophers continue to teach and write as though insights 
from unknown parts of the world could be ignored, the profession as a 
whole is alive with cross-cultural meetings and discussions where the 
longest thoughts of cultures previously not in close communication are 
revitalizing the deliberations of those who have thought most deeply 
about the endangered future. Attracting less attention than absolutistic 
nations parading their nuclear missiles and delivery systems, philosophers 
are sifting through the ideas of the newly encountered cultures of man­
kind, joined together in their work by the shared understanding that men 
and women want something more to look forward to than what Gunnar 
Myrdal calls “the great technological breakthroughs yet to come.”2
3 Asian Drama: An Inquiry Into the Poverty of Nations (New York: Twentieth 
Century Fund, 1968), Vol. I, p. 702.
3 Kenneth Meg ill, “Lukacs* History and Class Consciousness," Social Praxis 1,1 
(1973), pp. 97-98; also Howard Press, “The Existential Basis of Marxism,” Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research XXXVII (March 1977), pp. 331-45.
* Buddha (Praha: Orbis, 1968). See Oldrich Prochazka, “Zbynek Fiser and ‘The 
Consolation of Ontology,’ ” Crane Review X, 1 (Fall 1967), pp. 1-16. “Man is not an 
unfree cog in a world machine,” Fiser writes. “Man is not deprived of his meaning 
by the lack of an immortal soul. Just the contrary, state the Buddhists. Due to this lack, 
man acquires a creative meaning, a significance, and a dignity” (quoted by Prochazka, 
p. 11).
Philosophy is in the initial stages of a renaissance, after years of neglect 
in the shadows of spectacular technological and industrial growth. 
“Philosophers are now more responsible than anyone else for the future 
of mankind; I am full of fight and belief for the future.” These are the 
words of Professor Kuczynski of Warsaw, who is working on a reconstruc­
tion of Marx’s concept of praxis. The most famous Marxist intellectual 
in Europe was writing what he called “the ontology of social existence” 
when he died a decade ago. “The aesthetics of everyday life,” he wrote, 
“is the key to the solution of the question of the meaning of man’s ex­
istence.”3 Lukacs looked to “the Budapest School” to continue his 
leadership in European Marxist thought. In Czechoslovakia, Zbynek 
Fiser has published two books on the ontological nature of being, as well 
as one on Buddhism; both books reject the long reign of substance from 
its ancient origin with the Atomists and Aristotle in Greece. The true 
ontological model, Fiser believes, is non-substantial, and in this, he 
writes, “the Oriental philosophies come closer to understanding reality 
than the West, with Buddhism closest of all.”4
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These words from Eastern Europe serve to illustrate the philosophical 
renaissance, because they penetrate the conventional wisdom and rigid 
ideological stance of politics. They bear witness to the burgeoning need 
everywhere for rational discourse to move against the prevailing winds 
of doctrine. They are echoed in the West, where Norman O. Brown has 
written that what he called “the real fight” is not the political fight; “the 
next generation needs to be told that the next move is from politics to 
life.”5 And David Hall argues in a new book that “the society of the 
future will be less inclined toward a God who is ‘from age to age the same’ 
and more desirous of a god or gods who can help make sense of the 
immediate flux of experience and its relation to the next emergent mo­
ment.”6
5 “Reply to Herbert Marcuse,” in Theodore Roszak, ed.» Sources (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 248-53. The real fight is to put an end to politics, to 
penetrate politics to the creator spirit which is life itself. “From politics to life”: to 
perceive in all human culture the hidden reality of “the Holy Communion as the basis 
of community,” and “the language is the language not of reason but of love.”
6 The Uncertain Phoenix: Adventures Toward a Post-Cultural Sensibility (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1981). The closing words of Hall’s book are: “The way is 
now open to us to recognize the manyness of our religious experiencing, the variety of 
ways we encounter the holy. Our name is Legion ... and our gods are many.”
7 From the “Nirvana: The Aesthetic Center of Life” chapter of his forthcoming 
book Buddhism's Encounter with American Thought (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1982).
Hall’s work reminds one of Nirvana, the only reality we ever 
experience—the moment in which the flower is at an unprecedented stage 
of blooming and the creativity of the passing moment is putting the 
finishing touches on the essential artistry of life.7 Hartshorne suggests 
that God be defined in ways that yield insights necessary to prevent cosmic 
anarchy, insights that enable men and women to contribute to a permanent 
treasury of achievement, instead of merely to their perishing days and 
years. Similar thoughts were expressed a half century ago by Nishida 
Kitard, whose profoundly Buddhist philosophy found a central place for 
the qualities that are alive in the passing now, qualities that constitute what 
he called “pure experience,” which awaken men and women to the almost 
secret bond of intuitive love, that mystery not obvious in ordinary ex­
perience holding the universe together, or, to put it more closely to 
Nishida’s deeper meaning, the mystery that “pours its fullness forth out 
of the formlessness of the aesthetically breathtaking wow.” According to 
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Nishida, pure experience, “pure feeling,” is impersonal, neither mine nor 
yours, I or Thou, subject or object, time or space, but the life out of 
which all are formed.8
8 Fundamental Problems of Philosophy, trans. David A. Dilworth (Tokyo: Sophia 
University, 1970), pp. 248-49.
These are some of the long, long thoughts found in philosophers at 
work in the manyness of an increasingly interdependent world. Philos­
ophers are made by times like these, when mankind seems to be reaching 
for deeper syntheses than can be found in the encapsulated culture-worlds 
of the past, when new options are needed by people who can no longer 
find richness of life within their own confining social womb, when political 
and ecclesiastical traditions are no longer able to use their linguistic sym­
bols to enthrall, nor the military-industrial complex conduct all inter- 
cultural discussions through official self-reinforcing channels.
In philosophy today, the gods are Legion, and reasoning can no longer 
be cut away, as separable from experience that is concrete and alive. 
Philosophy must now help the individual to take the abstract citizen, 
consumer, laborer, lover back into himself and enable him to take 
responsibility for a world suddenly emancipated from the taken-for- 
granted intellectual confinements of the past. The weight of tradition is 
being weakened—by technology, communication, travel, migration—and 
people are forced to choose their most basic beliefs. Philosophers disagree 
too much to tell them what to believe; the task of the philosopher is to 
clarify the options and provide reasons to which beliefs can appeal. The 
responsibility of philosophy is centered here.
No obstacle looms larger to all efforts “to figure out ways to become 
successfully interdependent” than the one to which the remainder of 
the present essay is devoted. The major source of retardation endangering 
the future planetary civilization about which so much has been written 
is not the autonomous nation whose wars have made our century in­
famous for all time. The major obstacle is the kind of selfhood in which 
the terrors of the modern nation are rooted. It is this archaic legacy of a 
self-substance, mutually independent of all others, which supports the 
entire superstructure of Western nations. Whatever a person learns from 
family, peers, other persons, books, newspapers, television and internal 
subconscious experience such as dreams—all is organized around the 
demands and interests of a self that maintains its strict identity through 
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change. This is one of the major sources of alienation, the great scourge 
of life in the West. The way Marx put it in his essay, “On the Jewish 
Question/’9 the relationships that hold sway in the political state “leave 
the reality of the individual untouched; this is why man in his accidental 
existence, man as he comes and goes, man as he is corrupted by the 
whole organization of our society is lost to himself, given over to the 
domination of inhuman conditions, believing that life in the political 
state is the true life even though it leaves one's individuality untouched."
9 First published in the Deutschfranzosische Jahrbucher (February 1844), pp. 182- 
214. See David McLellan, Karl Marx: Early Texts (New York: Barnes and Noble, 
1971), pp. 85-114; also T. B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1963; London: Watts, 1963).
The behavior of this modern nation is a complicated consequence of 
the way its citizens perceive themselves, what they presuppose regarding 
the meaning of their lives, and how they assume life is to be analyzed, 
understood, and changed. The nation is their delusions and compulsive 
drives projected onto the larger screen; it incorporates those insatiable 
altars of glory (to use Karen Horney’s phrase) on which individuals 
sacrifice their lives. The troubles nations have with one another are also 
vastly compounded versions of the difficulties individuals and social 
groups have with one another, difficulties traceable in the last resort 
to the illusions of the encapsulated substantial self. People either confirm 
or deny and move to abolish the lines that divide the social classes which 
are so prominent a part of European life. Individuals in the United States 
either reinforce or move against the racial and ethnic minorities of which 
the nation is so largely composed.
Hitler and Stalin, and in our own time Ronald Reagan and Menachem 
Begin, are for the most part answers to their respective people’s self­
encapsulated prayers. And behind the prayer is the sacrosanct and 
counterfeit politics of one of the oldest and most deeply-rooted 
assumptions of non-Buddhist areas of the world—the generic, self­
justifying, independent, substantial self.
To perceive and probe the hidden metaphysical confusion of the self 
has become the essential problem endangering the future of mankind. It 
is to perceive what kind of self is daily sustaining conditions throughout 
the world that kill 15.5 million infants under four years of age every year, 
half of them from malnutrition or starvation. It is to perceive the kind of 
self that continues to advertise cigarettes while demanding still more 
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conclusive proof that millions of men and women are smoking themselves 
to death. It is to discover what kind of self-perceptions are involved in 
imaginative schemes for economic and social improvement of relations 
between rich and poor, North and South, East and West, which tend year 
upon year only to exacerbate the problem and make cynics of otherwise 
responsible men and women. It is to make a start, at least, in wondering 
how much evidence would be enough to turn our attention to the real 
reason why racial issues in Rhodesia and South Africa, and religious 
issues in the nations of Islam, do not yield to the best-laid plans of the 
most intelligent men and women of our time. It would be a start if we 
began to wonder if all the famous statements of “civil rights” and “human 
rights,” and recent efforts to create an international monetary and in­
dustrial system no longer controlled by the West, carry anyone any farther 
than the logical absurdity of mutually independent substantial selves too 
deeply entrenched in the incompleteness of self-understanding to solve 
the problems that threaten the species with extinction.
It is worth wondering, for example, why everything that characterizes 
human experience is found in the natural world—except the self endowed 
upon everyone at birth; and, conversely, why everything found in the 
natural world is found in human experience—except these illusory selves. 
In the research institutes of quantum mechanics, microbiology, and 
high-energy physics, nothing is found which resembles such independent 
and irreducible substances; nothing is found that is not further analyzable 
in the context of which it is an organic part.
It is one of the strangest coincidences of our time that the discoveries 
exposing the illusions of the barbaric self come to us, not from psychology 
and the social sciences, as one might expect, but from the science usually 
considered most remote from the interiority of life. Quantum physics 
supports a perception of reality disallowing the possibility of anyone 
living a purely private existence independent of contemporaries. 
Elementary particles studied in high-energy physics are seen to be in 
immediate connection, each a set of relationships reaching outward to 
other things.10 The more we penetrate into the submicroscopic world, 
the more we see the world as a system of inseparable components, an 
unbroken wholeness of which each man or woman is an integral part.
10 Henry Stapp, “S-Matrix Interpretation of Quantum Theory,” Physical Review 
D-3 (1971), p. 1303.
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Fritjof Capra draws the obvious conclusion:
Most of today’s physicists do not seem to realize the philosophical, 
cultural and spiritual implications of their theories. Many of them 
actively support a society which is still based on the mechanistic, 
fragmented world view, without seeing that science points beyond 
such a view, towards a oneness of the universe which includes not 
only our natural environment but also our fellow human beings. I 
believe that the world view implied by modem physics is inconsistent 
with our present society, which does not reflect the harmonious inter­
relatedness we observe in nature. To achieve such a state of dynamic 
balance, a radically different social and economic structure will be 
needed: a cultural revolution in the true sense of the word. The 
survival of our whole civilization may depend on whether we can bring 
about such a change.11
11 The Tao of Physics (Berkeley: Shambhala, 1975), pp. 307-308.
12 Essays in Science and Philosophy (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), p. 67.
It is time to penetrate more deeply into the nature of our own experience, 
at least to wonder if the self is one thing and what happens to it is another, 
or, if like every other entity in nature, it is to be understood in terms of the 
way it is interwoven with what we have called “the unbroken wholeness 
of the world.” Modern technology has suddenly given large-scale organiza­
tions such unimaginable power that it cannot be used constructively with­
out more penetrating revisioning of the nature of the self. How explosive 
this situation is can be seen in the remark by Whitehead, that “the whole 
literature of the European races on the subject of ‘personal identity’ is 
based upon notions which, within the last hundred years, have been 
completely discarded.”12
Any concept of the self is an effort to express the limitlessness of human 
experience within the limits of language, and as such it is apt to be sur­
rounded with the atmosphere of absurdity. How can the self be construed 
in its full concreteness, in the way it is interwoven in the web of existence, 
such that its present enjoyment is enhanced by aiming at a good which is 
not and cannot be its own? This is the essential question Buddhism has 
been asking for more than two thousand years. Buddhism was first to 
perceive the illusion in the idea of a plurality of selves mutually external 
to each other, the fundamental alternative being the universal participation
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of selves in the lives of one another, formulated in the doctrine of pratitya- 
samutpada (paficca-samuppada), meaning the interpenetration and co­
origination of each entity for good or evil in all the others. As this formula 
suggests, society is more fundamental than substance, and self-interest 
loses its privileged metaphysical ground. Nothing has a self-established 
nature (svabhava) either beyond or above or within the great “Stream 
of Being.*' Man has fabricated the supposititious self and used it 
disastrously as the living center of his behavior. Men and women cling 
hardest of all to the illusion that at the core of their being there is an 
indestructible, unitary, coherent Soul.13 What is really real is the non­
existence of any independent substance. Creative co-origination is all there is.
13 See my Buddhism: The Religion of Analysis (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1970), especially Chapter IV, “The Indispensable Key,” p. 82.
14, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method (LaSalle: Open Court, 1970), p. 200.
As insight is won into the real nature of our experience, it becomes clear 
that the basic motivation in every reality-oriented man or woman is for 
the increasing vividness and harmony of quality that makes each fugitive 
moment unique forever. Buddhism’s probing opens experience to the 
aesthetic foundations of the world.
The essential question is formulated in the Christian tradition in a 
somewhat different way. How can the self be understood in the fullness 
of what is really real, such that the basic appeal is never for something that 
is its own, but rather for something more general and yet more concrete, 
the appeal of life for life, acting now to protect life in self and others, and 
tomorrow to enrich life in people yet unborn? Most, or many, thoughtful 
Christians would recognize this question as their own. Many would 
dismiss it as unrealistic or unattainable, and therefore not worth dwelling 
upon. Most Christian philosophers have been, and for the most part 
remain, trapped in the not further analyzable entities whose self-love 
reputedly does not contradict love for selves equally alone in the ontology 
of a living world. Hartshorne puts the metaphysical confusion of the 
Christian in the simplest terms: “To love oneself as identical with oneself 
and the other as not identical with oneself is not, whatever else it may be, 
to love thy neighbour as oneself. Rather it is to put a metaphysical differ­
ence between the two loves. To make self-centeredness, no matter how 
subtly or ingeniously, the first principle is a strange misuse of reason. It 
is time religious people faced the ‘as yourself’ and made up their minds 
about it.”14
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For me it is virtually self-evident that neither individual nor national 
self-interest can be the principle of action for a truly rational animal. 
Not even sub-rational animals in fact derive all their other-regarding 
behaviour from self-concern. The notion that self-preservation is the 
law of nature is poor biology. Species-preservation is closer to the true 
law.15
15 Ibid., pp. xix-xx.
16 Ibid., pp. 200-201.
The only major American philosopher to have probed deeply in Buddhist 
thought throughout his long career, Hartshorne draws the following con­
clusion:
At this point Buddhism and a Christianity or Judaism that under­
stands itself are at one. The difference between self-love and love of 
others is not metaphysical, nor anything absolute, but a relative 
matter.16
It is surpassing strange that a society looking for a whole series of dis­
coveries in the eighties to transform the world as the first two industrial 
revolutions transformed Europe and America should simply take for 
granted in the most uncritical and even belligerent way a concept of Self 
that regulated personal feelings and provided a measure of social solidarity 
in pre-modem societies, but now prevents a global community from taking 
firm root in the concrete experience and most reliable knowledge about the 
entire natural world.
What accounts for the tenacity with which this self-serving assumption 
of personal identity is held? Why the cloud of unknowing hovering over 
the experience of every man or woman, unaware that life is fully actual 
and concretely real only in its momentary states? Why the long captivity 
to self-serving illusions, incapacitating individuals from experiencing 
themselves as centered in the novel forms of togetherness incarnate in the 
momentary now? Why this strange inability to see that egocentric motiva­
tions, as the Buddha saw, constitute a way of “writhing in delusion” ?
There are three answers to the question of the Self’s strange, imperious, 
irrational rule, one stemming from the nature of language, another from 
the influence of the group in which one’s life is interwoven. A third 
answer, stressed particularly in the Buddhist perspective, is the whole 
matrix of compulsive drives which appear to constitute the Self as a 
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functioning person but are the clue to suffering of all kinds.17
17 Sec Buddhism: The Religion of Analysis, pp. 67-92.
Man imagines that he merely speaks, when actually his language be­
comes the rule of life, the categories becoming his linguistic prison and 
his cage. Indo-European languages especially serve to sustain the illusion 
of the substantial Self, so that philosophers like David Hume have felt 
called upon to allocate huge expenditures of energy in efforts to dispel 
the illusion. There is no thinker but the thoughts, no perceiver but the 
perceptions. If Descartes had taken his stand with the evidence, he 
would have said, not cogito ergo sum, but “there are thoughts”; not 
dubito ergo sum, but “there are doubts.” It is conventional language which 
has crippled our understanding. Just as auditory cliches limit our ability 
to hear, and visual stereotypes our ability to use our eyes, so language 
limits our conscious experience of the inner workings of life.
A second answer concerning the strange grip of the illusory Self has 
more to do with those social motivations that seem to hang in the atmo­
sphere as we come of age. Willy-nilly, most people go along with the 
program culture imposes, with the result that cultural irrationality is 
deeply entrenched in the lives of all of us. Perhaps the most dramatic 
simple illustration is ready at hand in the career of the most widely read 
American writer, Ernest Hemingway. Reading the series of little vignettes 
published under the title, The Moveable Feast (1964), we are able to look 
down the long vista of Hemingway’s future suicide. He tells us in his own 
words about the apartment in Paris, his wife and small child, and the 
small group of writers and artists of the same approximate age, and one 
slowly comes to understand why he blew out his brains when his writing 
days were over. The Moveable Feast reveals Hemingway squeezing every­
thing from each passing day, exploiting every joy and friendship for the 
predetermined end of becoming a writer, having no organic relationship 
with the human community and the rest of nature, except the food and 
sex and excitement shared with the animal kingdom at large. In the preface 
of a novel written about himself and his friends, he said, “You are all a 
lost generation,” but Hemingway never discovered why they were lost. 
Hemingway was the fruit of a pathological individualism—self-interest 
raised to the level of an ideology—writing prose on subjects of the nar­
rowest individual significance—a quarrel between a girl and her lover 
in a railway station, the tragedy of a man having his testicles shot away 
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in a war, the mind of a bullfighter. With all his literary skill, Hemingway 
lived away from life, locked into self-centeredness, violating the basic rule 
of life that aesthetic quality is never a means to an end, never the fruit 
of experience, but experience itself in its vividness, intensity, and harmo­
nious flow. Hemingway did nothing to help his readers penetrate beyond 
the menagerie of cultural atmosphere and social motivations into the 
concreteness of life itself in its natural, spontaneous, qualitative flow. 
Hemingway lived the self-destructive Self.
The irrational tower of the substantial Self is its own matrix of com­
pulsive, unconscious drives. An impermanent creature in a changing 
world, man hangs like a leech to some part of that world, even if he has 
to invent the irrational Self to relieve the stress. Tank a, compulsive cling­
ing, is a style of life. Western research has long been at work on com­
pulsive hungers, one of the chief sources of the career of consumerism 
in modem life. Research is filled with case histories of grown men ruled 
by the traumatic experiences of a child, such as the famous engineer with 
a bridge-building career, who was afflicted as a child with nocturnal 
enuresis; or the leading vacuum-cleaner salesman in New England who 
had been frightened as a small child over the presence of bacteria in dust. 
Both cases come from the Harvard psychological clinic.18 The literature 
abounds with studies of narcissistic passions and emotional dependencies 
all of which serve to bear out the basic insight of the Buddha regarding 
the way suffering is rooted in man’s own compulsive drives. Central to 
the suffering is the fabricated Self who suffers, the falsified ego that 
organizes the aesthetic wonder of this world in accordance with goals and 
goods for which more or less exact specifications have been drawn. This 
is the third source of the Self’s imperious self-justifying rule over all the 
possibilities of an emerging world. Unconscious motivational drives 
attach themselves to the self-centered person for numerous reasons we 
need not discuss in this context, such as the indeterminacy at the center of 
a normal human being (associated directly with one’s possibilities for 
all-sided growth), or the machinations of the pseudo-self whose unnatural 
status must be defended at all costs, or the infection spread from one 
individual and generation to the next by the philosophy of substance and 
substantial selves.
18 Henry A. Murray, Explorations in Personality (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1938).
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It is a matter of survival as civilized communities today that 
we reexamine human experience, and experience it in all its immediacy 
and spontaneity, seeking to rediscover what it means to be persons related 
as individuals to the rest of nature, including people from beyond our 
self-encapsulated ancestral societies and nations. This is an interest that 
cannot be limited without falling into unreason. “Logicality inexorably 
requires that our interests shall not be limited. They must not stop at 
our own fate, but must embrace the whole community. This community, 
again, must not be limited, but must extend to all races of beings with 
whom we can come into immediate or mediate intellectual relation.”19 
Unlimited continuance of inquiry into the social nature of experience is 
an indispensable requirement of logic, according to America’s foremost 
philosopher of logic and science.
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul 
Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934, 1960), Vol. V, par. 654; hereafter 
referred to as CPP.
20 Whitehead's Philosophy: Selected Essays, 1935-1970 (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1972), p. 131.
Philosophers have only construed the world in different perspectives 
from their self-encapsulated libraries and conceptual systems; the point, 
however, is to experience it in whatever intensity and harmony it embodies, 
to attend to its changes as each fleeting moment follows upon the heels 
of another. The point is to feel the concreteness of the flower at an un­
precedented stage of blooming, and to feel the feelings of other moments 
in the stream of becoming. Dim and fragmentary though it may be, our 
experience yet “sounds the utmost depths of reality,” and the primitive 
experience is feeling, vague and unformed. This, Hartshorne argues, is 
the “true empiricism” of process philosophies originating in Heraclitus, 
Fechner, Lequier, Bergson, James, Peirce, Whitehead and some aspects of 
Dewey. In a book on Whitehead’s philosophy, Hartshorne writes as follows:
The true empiricism, Whitehead said, will not try to invent an 
absolutely different concept from that of experience, with its aspects 
of feeling, memory, love, freedom, and so on, in order to explain the 
nonhuman, but will generalize these aspects so that, though we can 
only dimly imagine how, they will cover all possible forms of in­
dividual existence, not only from particles to man, but even from 
man to God.20
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Feeling is the essence or root of experience. “The world is felt first and 
only then, perhaps, known.”21 “One is immediately conscious of his 
feelings; but not that they are feelings of an ego; the self is only inferred; 
there is no time in the Present for any inference at all.”22 We find the 
same reflection upon experience in Nishida, who interpreted the loftiest 
moral ideal of Japan—loyalty—as the expression of what he called “pure 
feeling.” “The object of feeling,” he wrote, “cannot be intellectually 
determined nor frozen spatially; it is infinite movement; indeed, while it 
has form, it is the formless; herein a culture of feeling can be conceived.” 
Japan, he said, is “a culture neither of eidos nor of ritual, but one of pure 
feeling.”23
21 Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, p. 76.
22 CPP, Vol. V, par. 462; see also CPP, Vol. VII, pars. 538-40.
23 Fundamental Problems of Philosophy, pp. 248, 252.
2* CPP, Vol. I, par. 357.
25 CPP, Vol. VI, par. 553.
Examination of experience in its immediacy and intensity led Peirce to 
his category of Firstness: “What the world was to Adam on the day he 
opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had become 
conscious of his own existence—that is first, present, immediate, fresh, new, 
initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and evanescent."2* 
“It is sufficient to go out into the air and open one's eyes to see that the world 
is a living spontaneity.9'25
The more anyone wins fundamental insight into what is actually taking 
place in one’s own experience, the more awareness grows that events 
too elusive and fleeting to arouse more than feeling are gone before they 
can be taken into account. Each of these events joins with all the others 
to produce the portrait of our lives, a portrait created each moment as 
qualities lead us to make choices as the world turns. No man or woman 
is so poor as to be unable to participate in a human career consisting of 
events incompletely determined in advance, events flowing through the 
extensive continuum of the world at large. Even prior to conscious thought, 
experience on nonverbal levels is being judged for its vividness, intensity, 
breadth and harmony, and for the contrasts evoked in its organic fullness 
as it passes. Each moment inherits along innumerable lines—“the Many 
become One and are increased by one”—creatively forming the relevant 
qualities into a new organic unity in a universe that is alive to its micro­
scopic depths. Much of life is compulsive and habit-ridden, but every 
50
A BUDDHISTIC-CHRISTIAN PROBE
moment taken fully into account is actually a synthesis of old and new, 
and thus a novel form of togetherness in an emerging world. Depending 
upon one’s level of awareness, whether sound asleep and “dozing one’s 
life away like a dirty beast,’’ or quick and awake to what is really the 
case, each individual is nonetheless involved in a process of self-creation. 
Increasing awareness lifts an individual more vividly into a universe that 
is always new, into a richness of quality never experienced in the past. 
All individuals have the unity of the universe as their common ground. 
Everyone and everything play a role in shaping the self-surpassing organic 
whole. The whole world conspires to produce a new creation, and at the 
same time presents to the passing moment its opportunities and its 
limitations.26
26 A. N. Whitehead, Religion in the Making (New York: Macmillan, 1926), pp. 
112-15.
27 Modes of Thought (New York: Free Press, 1938, 1966), p. 166.
Personal identity is found in this process of aesthetic enrichment, enabling 
us to inherit more perceptively and vividly the legacy of qualities experienced 
in the past. The base line of personal identity is not the substantial Self 
with a nature of its own (svabhdva), existing from the first moment of its 
birth and acquiring and containing whatever occurs. Each passing mo­
ment is an occasion of experience with its own unity, the outcome of 
creative synthesis whereby the many events of the past live forevermore in 
the novel emergent now. There is no other unity from which the oneness 
of momentary experience can be derived. It has nothing as its object; it is 
self-enjoyed; it is self-created; and, in turn, it becomes part of the cumula­
tive immortal past gathered into another novel form of togetherness in 
moments that follow. The fleeting moment itself possesses nothing, is 
contained by nothing, simply and fundamentally is. It is free, therefore, 
to feel and to celebrate life, whether the fleeting moments be part of its 
own series or belong to another person’s stream of becoming.
The identity and order of an individual’s life, therefore, is either found 
in these passing moments where we become creators of ourselves and of 
one another—or the identity and order are thrown overboard, one 
imperceptible dribble at a time. The individual enjoyment, Whitehead 
writes, “is what I am in my role of a natural activity, as I shape the activities 
of the environment into a new creation, which is myself at this moment; 
and yet, as being myself, it is a continuation of the antecedent world.”27
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The self-surpassing oneness of life carries creative power so great 
that even locked away in their own self-systems men and women have a 
sense of their own creativity half forgotten. Crippled by self-centeredness, 
each is still a participant in the interiority of a world that is novel, original, 
spontaneous, and organically one.
This is the social vision of personal identity surfacing in the writings of 
Hartshorne, Whitehead, and Peirce. Hartshorne believes that much 
dispute about personal identity is chiefly dispute about words. “7%e 
latest subject” he argues, “contains all that there is to the unity of the 
self as actual; the latest subject contains the whole self.”2* “My awareness 
of my past tends to be more vivid and direct than of the past of others, 
but this is no absolute difference.”28 9 The unity of the personality is 
merely one prominent strand of the society of subjects experiencing 
unifying experiences of certain data fusing themselves into a novel for­
mation, each personality organically linked, indeed embodied in others 
at every stage of its growth. Each career continues to live and breathe and 
have its being in the total matrix of its connective growth, and every 
person continues to live in others very much longer than superficial 
observers think. This is what Peirce wrote. The selfhood we attribute some­
times to ourselves, he argued, “is for the most part the vulgarest delusion 
of vanity.”30
28 “The Structure of Givenness,” Philosophical Forum (1960-1961), p. 31.
29 “Personal Identity from A to Z,” Process Studies 2, 3 (Fall 1972), p. 213.
30 CPP, Vol. VH, par. 571; see also Vol. VII, pars. 573-77.
The leading theologian at the University of Chicago forty years ago, 
attracting students from all over the United States, was Henry Nelson 
Wieman. Coming out of Harvard just before the arrival of Whitehead, 
Wieman probed deeply into the works of the great Englishman and, 
along with Hartshorne, was responsible for lifting Process Philosophy to 
dominance for the first time in graduate studies in philosophy and religion 
at Chicago. Whitehead’s concepts of prehension and creativity appear 
in Wieman’s work in his extensive writings about “Creative Interchange,” 
the ultimate source of value, the central loyalty of human life. Creative 
interchange forms and reforms the world, sustaining an experience of 
unshakable security and fresh rejuvenation even in the absence of any 
belief. “Indeed,” Wieman writes, “when all beliefs and hopes fade out 
and one commits himself to whatever might possibly give any meaning to 
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life beyond his knowing, and does it with full acceptance of the unknown 
consequences no matter what they may be, then and only then does there 
rise up out of the flow of felt quality in the fulness of its power the sense 
of ultimate security, bringing with it intimations of a way of life never yet 
experienced. This kind of commitment,” Wieman continues, “ro a process 
and not to any belief seems to purge life of its corruptions by clearing 
away all established ways of living, all beliefs and other structures, thus 
enabling creativity to bring forth ways of living more fit to deal with the 
new conditions and with problems heretofore never encountered.”31 Some 
observers thought of Wieman as propounding a kind of social mysticism 
generalized to the world at large. The social nature of experience provides 
ceaseless occasions of ecstasy viewed as the experience in another (whether 
that other be another human being, a natural or “artificial” object, or 
oneself in the immediate future) of that creativity that sustains the world.
31 “Intellectual Autobiography,” p. 43, an unpublished paper in the Archives of 
Southern Illinois University; italics mine.
No “non-identity,” therefore, ever separates fellow-creatures from one 
another when the bifurcating Self, through analysis and meditation, is 
retired as a source of confusion. This is the basis for both personal identity 
and compassion in the Buddhist orientation. Fleeting events (khana-vada 
or ksana-vddd) either fall into more or less definite strands of becoming, 
or the self of each person is inescapably non-identical with its fellow­
creatures, including all creatures in the ecosystem of life. In the 
first alternative—the Buddhist perspective—people form their identities 
as social facts in the course of their growth. In the latter alternative—the 
self-centered, culture-encapsulated way of the modem world—individuals 
find their own experiences confused and habit-ridden, and afflicted with 
the ruin that is reflected in their faces, alienated from all that is really real. 
Their unnatural non-identity with other lives generates ever fresh occasions 
for violence and authoritarian control over the living world.
The whole of Buddhist philosophy in all its branches is permeated with 
perspective on the creativity incarnate in the momentariness of life. 
Behind the vast background of feeling and quality barely touched by 
the forms of conscious thought, a background to which the human species 
gives some evidence presently of awakening, lie the creative energizing 
intuitions of life itself. The Buddhist term for the truly singular events is 
khapa-vada, moments in what might be called the micro-process of 
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millions of daily experiences beyond the grasp of memory, perhaps, and 
for the relatively gross scale and measure of our perception as well.
This is the creativity implied in the notion of karma, that persons are 
self-created and that no deity can therefore be held responsible for any 
of the details. Everything in the world creates itself as it passes and 
becomes a part of a new creation. In his widely read inquiry into Western 
interpretations of Nirvana, Guy Richard Welbon comments that “crea­
tivity pervades both the way and the goal of Buddhism,” and that “ignor­
ing its presence would be to imperil any attempt to understand 
the Buddhist Nirvana,” and to overlook the major distinction between 
Buddhism and its Hindu background.32 Creative synthesis of past data 
into present khaiia-vada is what is going on in the momentary now. 
Herbert Guenther agrees. “This,” he says, “is the Buddhist conception 
of the unconditional realness of what there is.”33 “Creative forces,” he 
writes, “are all that exist.”34
32 The Buddhist Nirvana and its Western Interpreters (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1968), p. 304.
33 Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice (New York: Penguin, 1971), p. 19.
3* Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma (Berkeley: Shambhala, 1974), p. 241.
35 Whitehead's Philosophy, p. 130; see also p. 5.
36 “The Structure of Givenness,” p. 31, and “Personal Identity from A to Z,” p. 215.
Buddhism is mankind's most persevering effort to participate in the 
creativity incarnate in the passage of what Malalasekera called “the 
fulfilled now” This, Hartshorne writes, “is Whitehead’s profoundly ori­
ginal discovery anticipated only in ancient Buddhism.”35 It is not a mere 
metaphor that we are members one of another in a world that is creative 
in every cell. In the midst of an essay on “the structure of givenness,” 
Hartshorne stops to make the following observation:
I would about as soon die as give up this notion. It makes the injunc­
tion, Love thy neighbor as thyself, metaphysical good sense, as the 
usual substance doctrine does not. The Buddhists had just this in mind 
for many centuries, in all branches of Buddhism. I think they have a 
precious lesson to teach Christians at this point. It is time to rejoin 
the Buddhist tradition, the most subtle of all very old international 
philosophical religious traditions.36
In both Christian and Buddhist thought, the art of loving involves 
the penetration of all the egocentered compulsive drives and delusions 
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that prevent men and women from participating in the fullness of ex­
perience and taking responsibility for preserving the endangered future. 
The art of loving is the art of unlearning whatever obscures the matrix 
of relations we bear with other human beings and with the speechless 
world’s living creatures. It is the art of responsible caring which involves 
the uprooting of the false self and its alienated social reality, opening 
individuals more fully to the undifferentiated, qualitative, aesthetic 
continuum which in but different ways Buddhism and Christianity think 
of as the love that is the natural state when one’s experience is free, when 
it is calm, when it is at peace—qualities self-evidentially given in immediate 
experience as ego-installed impurities are removed.37
37 Hartshorne states the Christian position perhaps as forcibly as it has ever been 
expressed: "My most basic hunch about the meaning of life is that love or feeling-of- 
feeling is the primary principle, explanatory of everything, including givenness.... There 
are many reasons why this social structure has been missed by most philosophers. It is 
the stone rejected of the builders, the almost secret bond of intuitive love which holds the 
universe together. I cannot imagine that there is any other bond which can do this” 
(“The Structure of Givenness,” pp. 35-36; italics mine).
Civilizations up to now have thwarted and destroyed the intensity and 
richness of human experience, confining feeling to insatiable wants and 
to what is purely local, habit-ridden, parochial and familiar. Most of the 
poignant beauty and compassion of a creative world have thereby been 
lost. This is part of the angry past that is alive in everyone today. A new 
civilization without limits is now assuming responsibility for life on the 
planet, a civilization based for the first time in the individualized universe 
demanded by the aesthetic enjoyment of life, in that dimension found in 
our experience in comparison with which all else is a distraction, a delu­
sion, a fallacy of misplaced concreteness, part of the labyrinth surrounding 
the independent, irreducible, substantial, fabricated Self on which “the 
whole literature of the European races has been based.” By their efforts 
to dispel the fog and help their fellow-creatures discover what is really 
real in their own experience, philosophers can fulfill the role Professor 
Kuczynski assigns and become “more responsible than anyone else for the 
future of mankind.” It has been the thesis of this paper that the thread 
of Ariadne is to be found in the Buddhist-Christian reflections on the self— 
the thread that leads out of the labyrinth into the unspeakable beauty of 
this world, the thread that can preserve the endangered future as a scene 
of responsible action.
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